Forsaking the Forests for the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership by Vegter, Alyssa A.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 14 Number 2 
4-1-2005 
Forsaking the Forests for the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New 
Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership 
Alyssa A. Vegter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the 
Natural Resources Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alyssa A. Vegter, Comment, Forsaking the Forests for the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New Guinea 
Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 14 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 545 (2005). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol14/iss2/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2005 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association
FORSAKING THE FORESTS FOR THE TREES:
FORESTRY LAW IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA INHIBITS
INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY OWNERSHIP
Alyssa A. Vegtert
Abstract: Illegal logging in the tropical forests of Papua New Guinea is one of the
greatest threats to the forests and indigenous people of this island nation. Increasing
pressure from the commercial logging industry, legislation that restrains customary
ownership, and an unclear legal basis for this ownership subjects the indigenous people
of Papua New Guinea to unscrupulous, unsustainable, and illegal logging practices. As a
region central to the preservation of global ecological and cultural diversity, the
devastating consequences of illegal logging in Papua New Guinea have become
nationally and internationally significant.
Customary ownership of the forests by the indigenous clans of Papua New Guinea
is one of the best mechanisms for indigenous peoples to curtail these illegal activities.
Because indigenous peoples are the most dependent upon and familiar with forest
resources, they have the most incentive to protect them. Indigenous Papua New
Guineans can claim constitutional customary ownership over ninety-seven percent of the
forested land in their country. Their claim is further strengthened by international law,
which calls for empowerment of indigenous peoples and recognition of their customary
laws. The indigenous peoples of Papua New Guinea, however, cannot use their
customary law to the fullest extent possible in protecting their forests until the Forestry
Act of 1991 is revised and customary ownership is given a clear, legal basis through
further development in the land courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Illegal logging results in losses to governments of developing
countries of at least US $10 billion to US $15 billion annually.1 Illegal
practices are linked with corruption, bad governance, and the
impoverishment of rural communities that depend on forest products for
their food and household needs.2  In Papua New Guinea ("PNG"), eighty-
t The author would like to thank Professor Gregory Hicks and Professor Robert Anderson of the
University of Washington School of Law, as well as the attorneys of the Rural Development Institute and
the staff of Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for providing intellectual support and insightful critique of
my ideas and writing. I am also particularly indebted to my friends and family for providing emotional
support and guidance through this writing process. Any errors or omissions are entirely my own.
THE WORLD BANK, SUSTAINING FORESTS: A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 1 (2004) [hereinafter WB
SUSTAINING FORESTS]. A sampling of these countries includes Tanzania, Poland, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Honduras, Belize, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. See generally id., Appendices.
See generally INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, CUT AND RUN, ILLEGAL
LOGGING AND THE TIMBER TRADE IN THE TROPICS 10 (Rob Glastra, ed., 1999) [hereinafter CUT AND RUN].
Illegal forest activities include all acts that relate to forest ecosystems, forest-related industries, and timber
and non-timber forest products. They include acts violating rights to forest land, corrupt activities to
acquire forest concessions, and activities at all stages of forest management and the forest goods production
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five percent of the population is rural, and the majority of this population
lives at subsistence levels and depends on a healthy, natural environment for
survival.3 Despite this dependence, "[g]overnance has been particularly
poor in the area of forestry, with the side effect of promoting corrupt
practice and undermining environmental sustainability in logging
activities. ' 4  Unchecked illegal logging deeply affects the indigenous
peoples5 of PNG, who suffer losses of traditional sources of food, cultural
destruction, and ruination of spiritually significant areas.6
Customary ownership, recognized by the Constitution of 1975 and
numerous international instruments, can mitigate the problems caused by
illegal logging.7 The Constitution of PNG recognizes custom as forming
part of the underlying law of the country, along with adopted principles of
English common law and equity.8 Through custom, local indigenous clans
own ninety-nine percent of all forested land in PNG 9 and manage most of
chain, from the planning stages to harvesting and transport of raw material and finished products to
financial management. Id. at 10, 89-90. illegal forest activities also include violations of indigenous
peoples' rights, public trust, and public or private ownership ights that may involve acts against
constitutional, civil, criminal, or administrative law. See LUCA TACCONI Er AL., LEARNING LESSONS TO
PROMOTE FOREST CERTIFICATION AND CONTROL ILLEGAL LOGGING IN INDONESIA, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH 3 (2004).
3 See Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, Securitization and Consensuality, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 411, 431 (2002). See also ANIL AGARWAL AND SUNITA NARAIN, PROMOTING PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY TO REDRESS ECOLOGICAL POVERTY: A VIEW FROM THE SOUTH 1 (1989) [hereinafter
AGARWAL AND NARAIN].
' WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, REQUEST FOR INSPECTION FILED BY CERTAIN NAMED
CUSTOMARY OWNERS OF FORESTS IN KIUNGA-AIAMBAK, WESTERN PROVINCE, PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1 (Nov.
29, 2001) [hereinafter WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL].
5 The terms "customary owners" and "indigenous peoples" are used interchangeably in this
Comment. For the purposes of international law, indigenous peoples are defined as those groups that
"represent a common set of experiences rooted in historical subjugation by colonialism, or something like
colonialism. Today, indigenous peoples are identified, and identify themselves ... by reference to
identities that pre-date historical encroachments by other groups and the ensuing histories that have
challenged their cultural survival and self-determination as distinct peoples." S. James Anaya,
International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Towards the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 13-14 (2004). The customary landowning groups of PNG share historical
experiences that pre-date colonialism, and have continually faced challenges to their survival and self-
determination as distinct groups of people. See generally J.S. FINGLETON, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
INDIGENOUS GROUPS, FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE 34 (1998), available at http://www.fao.org/Legal/prs-
ol/lpol.pdf (last visited on Apr. 20, 2005).
6 See Bjerre, supra note 3, at 431. See also DANIELA RENNER, PEOPLE IN BETWEEN: A CASE STUDY
ON THE KUMIL TIMBER PROJECT 7 (Int'l Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs Doc. 65, 1990).
7 Rod Taylor, The State Versus Custom: Regulating Papua New Guinea's Timber Industry, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREST MANAGEMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 249, 258 (Colin Filer ed., 1997)
[hereinafter State Versus Custom].
I Id. at 249.
COLIN FILER & NtKHIL SEKHRAN, LOGGERS, DONORS & RESOURCE OWNERS 30 (1998)
[hereinafter RESOURCE OWNERS]. This is based on ninety-seven percent of the total land area that
remained unalienated by the colonial government at the time of independence. This land was granted at
independence in 1975 under customary ownership, and has increased modestly as customary groups
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these lands as common property.10  This constitutionally guaranteed
customary land ownership, combined with both the Fourth and Fifth Goals
of the Constitution and numerous international instruments, provides support
for the rights of customary owners to control their resources."I This control,
however, is curtailed by the Forestry Act of 1991 and unclear definitions of
customary ownership within the common law.
This Comment asserts that the commitment of constitutional and
intemational law to customary ownership of forested land in PNG, if further
strengthened and developed, can be effective in protecting the forests of
PNG from illegal logging. Part II explores the varied environments and
indigenous groups of PNG, the definitions and forms of customary
ownership by which they govern themselves, and the illegal logging that
threatens their survival. Part III argues that revising the Forestry Act of
1991 and developing a clear legal definition of customary ownership
through the land courts will strengthen the rights of customary owners.
Next, Part IV argues that stronger customary ownership of forests
decentralizes control, giving indigenous groups and clans incentive to invest
in and protect their forests from illegal logging. Ultimately, this protection
ensures the survival of the indigenous cultures and forests of PNG.
II. ILLEGAL LOGGING THREATENS THE ECOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL
DIVERSITY OF PNG
PNG contains one of the most biologically complex and culturally
significant tropical rainforests remaining in the world.' 2 There are roughly
seven hundred languages spoken by the indigenous population of PNG,
evidencing the extent of historical isolation and indigenous cultural variation
repossessed land given to others by the Australian colonial administration. See generally Fingleton, supra
note 5. See also State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 249.
10 JOHN WAGNER, "BLUE MOUNTAINS CONSTANTLY WALKING": THE RE-SIGNIFICATION OF NATURE
AND THE RE-CONFIGURATION OF THE COMMONS IN RURAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA 2 (Resource Management in
Asia-Pacific Working Paper No.24, 1999). Common property regimes are by far the dominant type of
property system in PNG and throughout the Pacific Islands. Id.11 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at iv. See also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
(FAO), LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SINCE RIO: LEGAL TRENDS IN AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 203 (FAO Legislative Study No. 73, 294, 2002). See also Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.HCHR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorties, 45th Sess., Annex No. 1, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES. 1994.45.En?OpenDocument
(last visited on Apr. 20, 2005).
12 JOHN SOWEI ET AL., ENVIRONMENT MONITOR 7 (National Research Institute, 2002) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENT MONITOR].
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among the groups that speak these languages.' 3  Separated into distinct
linguistic groups and dependant upon their land for food and resource needs,
the indigenous people of PNG have developed informal property law and
customary ownership unique to their own localities. 14  Often, these groups
manage their resources communally. 15  Looming over this framework ofdiverse cultures and forests is the threat posed by illegal logging.
A. The Physical Geography of PNG Has Created Extensive Biodiversily
and a Variety of Cultures
The topography of PNG is extremely varied. Part of the island of
New Guinea, plus over six hundred smaller islands and atolls make up
PNG's land area of approximately 464,000 km2.16 The main island consists
of a high central ridge with outlying mountain ranges; it is bordered to the
north and south by large, swampy flood plains. Many of the outlying islands
are rugged mountains with narrow coastal fringes. 17  Such extreme
differences in elevation create a number of diverse and isolated ecosystems.
The forested area of PNG covers about 279,932 km2 (with nearly
seventy-seven percent natural forest) and is extremely diverse.18 PNG is
home to approximately five to seven percent of the world's biodiversity,
remarkable for such a small country. 19 Mangroves flourish in coastal zones,
rainforests and swamp forests grow in the lowlands, and eucalypt savannah
20 21
and various forms of montane forest thrive in the mid-elevation lands.
Due to this large amount of ecological wealth in such a small country,
,,22
ecologists designate PNG as a biological "hotspot.
13 See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 25
LAW & SOc'Y REV. 759, 761 (1991).
14 See Anaya, supra note 5, at 37. This is typical of traditional groups with distinct cultural, social
and religious practices. Id.
15 See Defending Papua New Guinea, An Interview with Brian Brunton, Multinational Monitor, Vol.
17, No. 3 (March 1996), available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm396.06.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Brian Brunton]. See also WAGNER, supra note 10, at 2.
16 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 13.
17 See id.
Is See ENVIRONMENT MONITOR, supra note 12, at 2 (2002).
"9 See id. at 7.
20 "[G]rowing in, or being the biogeographic zone of relatively moist cool upland slopes below
timberline dominated by large evergreen trees." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 769 (1991).
21 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 13. Within these regions live 304 mammal species,
15,000-20,000 plant species, 1,500 tree species, and 733 bird species. Among these are some unique
species rarely found anywhere else on earth, such as tree kangaroos, birds of paradise, cassowaries, long-
beaked echidnas, and the Queen Alexandria's Birdwing Butterfly, the largest butterfly on earth with a
wings an of up to ten inches.
2 See John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 179, 191(2001). Hotspots are certain eco-regions, often within tropical forests, that contain
VOL. 14 No. 2
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The indigenous people of PNG reflect the varied topography within
which their cultures evolved. The 5.1 million people who live in PNG speak
seven hundred different languages.23 These languages represent their
different kinship and community groups. Indigenous groups dwell in either
traditional rural settlement patterns of villages containing populations of one
hundred to five hundred people, or in scattered family homesteads that each
24contain much smaller populations. Such variation results in identification
with and allegiances to families, clans, and local villages.
1. Villagers Primarily Identify with Their Local and Traditional
Societies
The indigenous people of PNG identify with their familial groups and
clans. Unlike other civilizations with 100,000-year histories, the indigenous
peoples of PNG remained decentralized in small clans of kinspeople that
enjoyed large measures of equality and liberty within their own regions.25
Their ethno-political roots are grounded in their loyalties to their clans, and
26are often far stronger than their loyalties to the state. Though broader
political commitments may exist,z7 allegiances are first and foremost based
on traditional hierarchies between young and old men and between men and
women. 28  Due to the localized nature of the indigenous populations and
"exceptional concentrations of species with exceptional levels of endemism" and that "face exceptional
degrees of threat." Id. at 181.
23 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 27.
24 See id. The Kumil Timber Rights Purchase area, which encompasses seven different language
groups, exemplifies this social structure. Of these groups, the Bunabun, Uligan, Meiwok and Ulatepun
represent larger settlement centers, but people here may still share some language base with the Ereinduk,
Pepaur, Toavulte-Korak, Meriwok, Tarikapa, Aleswan, or Gugubar language groups. RENNER, supra note
6, at 41.
25 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 761. Archeological studies have shown drainage tunnels cut into the
Wahgi Valley to be 9000 years old. Over thousands of years, the isolating topography played a part in
preventing the unification of Papua New Guinians under a single administration, as well as any
development of permanent classes of slaves, serfs, landless paupers, tenants, nobles, kings, or landlords.
Id.
26 See PENNER, supra note 6, at 7.27 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND
NOTE: PAPUA NEW GUINEA (2004), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn12797.htm#political (last visited Feb.
22, 2005). Because PNG is based on a Parliamentary system inherited from the colonial Australian
Administration, these regionally-based parties compete for power in a 109-seat unicameral Parliament.
PNG's politics are highly competitive with most members elected on a personal and ethnic basis rather than
as a result of party affiliation. Currently, the Melanesian Alliance Party, led by Michael Somare, who had
previously served as PNG's first Prime Minister, holds nineteen seats, making it the single largest party in
Parliament. Other parties include the National Alliance, People's Progress Party, Pangu Parti, and People's
Democratic Alliance. Id.28 PENNER, supra note 6, at 7.
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their subsistence lifestyles, the villagers' interests tend to revolve around
their natural resource base.
2. Most Indigenous Groups of PNG Depend on the Forests of Their
Customary Land for Food and Subsistence Needs
Eighty-five percent of the population of PNG continues to live in rural
29
areas and is thus dependent upon their customary land for survival. In
forested areas, rural villagers rely upon the forest for a variety of subsistence
resources. 30 For example, the customary landowners of forests in Kiunga-
Aiambak, Western Province, use their forests for the collection of housing
material for temporary birthing houses, building material for canoes, access
to sago palms which provide their local food staple, and hunting grounds for
animal protein.3' The forest ecosystems ensure clean and free-flowing
streams for water consumption, household use, and transport.32 In the Kumil
region in the Madang province, the indigenous population depends upon the
tropical rainforest to supply the entire basis for their livelihood: land for
gardens, hunting and fishing grounds, gathering of legumes, spices,
mushrooms, protection and shade, water, and materials for houses, canoes,
and ritual items.33 For these groups, as well as for many others, their
forested lands also represent sacred and spiritual places upon which they
base their oral tradition, language, and culture.
34
B. Unique and Local Forms of Customary Ownership Have Emerged
from This Variety of Cultures
Customary ownership applies to over ninety-seven percent of all the
land in Papua New Guinea. Customary ownership is proprietary or
possessory land ownership by which families, clans, or larger customary
groups generally own the land.3 6 Ninety-nine percent of all forested land is
29 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 27.
30 BERIT GUSTAFSSON, RURAL HOUSEHOLDS AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
6 (Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper No. 32, 2002). These resources include timber,
household items, firewood, food from the undergrowth such as fruit, nuts and oils, medicinal plants and
herbs, and water and fish from the rivers and streams. Id.
31 WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 17.
32 id.
33 RENNER, supra note 6, at 31.
34 WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 17. See also Bjerre, supra note 3, at 431.
35 ROMILLY L. KILA PAT, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN A CHANGING CONTEXT, DEPARTMENT OF
LANDS AND PHYSICAL PLANNING 1 (2003).
36 Brian Brunton, supra note 15.
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owned customarily.37 In a country of seven hundred different clans and
groups, customary ownership divides the land into small landholding
entities, defended communally, with resources allocated according to
reciprocal obligations.
38
1. The Details of Customary Ownership Vary in This Diverse Context
Cultural, social, and religious practices of traditional societies create
informal property laws and customary ownership. 39 The PNG Constitution
defines custom as "the usages of indigenous inhabitants of the country
existing.., at the time... and [in] the places ... [in] which the matter
arises, regardless of whether or not the custom.. . has existed from time
immemorial. 40 In a property context in a society as diverse as PNG, this
may mean that one clan's inheritance rules follow patrilineal lines, while
another clan's inheritance rules follow matrilineal lines. One clan may
forbid the sale of any parcels of land, while another may forbid the sale of
land to anyone outside of the clan. Alternatively, one clan may claim
ownership over land through use, while other clans may consider conquest
as the only means to claim customary ownership.
Such variation in ownership rules is not conducive to answering the
question of who owns the land.4 1 Dr. Peter Sack, professor at the University
of Papua New Guinea, writes:
[a]lthough the traditional right to control the land resembles in
some ways the Western concept of ownership, the group does
not own the land it controls in the traditional sense. Land
within a group's sphere of control remains ownerless. Further,
not only the non-ownable land but also the ownable objects on
the land remain ownerless when the right of control is
established. The right of control merely constitutes a claim that
the members of the group are entitled to acquire the ownership
of these objects and that outsiders are not entitled to do so,
unless they have the group's permission.4z
37 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 30.
38 Brian Brunton, supra note 15. See also Cooter, supra note 13, at 768-69.
39 Anaya, supra note 5, at 37.
4o PAPUAN.G. CONST. sch. 1.2(b) (1975).
41 Cooter, supra note 13, at 768.
42 PETER SACK, LAND BETWEEN TWO LAWS: EARLY EUROPEAN LAND ACQUISMONS IN NEW
GUINEA 41 (1973).
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Thus, the rights of full ownership are often unbundled and dispersed among
different people or groups.43 Such fragmented ownership may mean that a
family within a clan has the right to collect certain foods from a tract of
forest, but does not have the right to harvest timber for sale. Alternatively, it
may mean that they can harvest timber, but only for their own uses, with
limits set by mutual clan agreements.
Not surprisingly, the variables of customary ownership present a
challenge to judicial interpretation. The Supreme and National Courts of
PNG provide vague rules regarding the interpretation of customary
ownership. The leading case from the National Court is State v. Giddings, in
which two clans, the Ambai and the Pialin, continued their lengthy dispute
regarding the boundary between their customary lands.44 The provincial
land court delineated the boundary without proper notice to the parties,
without allowing them to present their cases in each other's presence, and
without holding public hearings.45  The National Court held that the
provincial land court had not observed the rules of natural justice, an action
that was inconsistent with the Land Disputes Settlement Act of 1975, which
required the court to "endeavor to do substantial justice between all persons
interested, in accordance with this Act and any relevant custom."46 Finally,
the National Court made substantive fmdings as to the relative weight given
to different and conflicting customary laws.
A second important case involves an issue of "standing" for an appeal
of a decision of the Provincial Land Courts. Augustine Olei, as
representative of two customary landowning clans, applied for an order to
quash a decision of the Provincial Land Court.48 The Provincial Land Court
had determined that ownership of the land known as Vanapa East fell to the
government, which could then sell the land to prospective vendors. 49 The
National Court found that, although the customary owners were not party to
the original proceedings before the Provincial Land Court, they still had
43 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 769.
44 See State v. Giddings, [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423. There had been four previous court proceedings
between the two clans, as well as four deaths over the disputed boundary. Id.
45 id.
46 id.
47 Cooter, supra note 13, at 796 n.59 citing State v. Giddings [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423. Writing for the
court, District Court Deputy Chief Judge Kearney supported the approach of testing competing traditional
accounts by reference to recent and existing facts established by evidence, and seeing, in the light of that,
which of the two competing accounts is more probable. He pointed to further case-law that has adopted
this approach. See Re Veakabu Vanapa, (Unreported pre-Independence Supreme Court judgment 547,
(1969)); Lilumpat Land Owning Group v. The Ianu and Sausau Clans of Kranket Re Piawai, Pig and Masas
Islands, [1974] P.N.G.L.R. 235. State v. Giddings [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423.
48 Auguste Olei v. The Provincial Land Court at Port Moresby [1984] P.N.G.L.R. 295.
41 See id.
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"sufficient interest" as "person[s] aggrieved" to bring their action.50 Though
the Court cautioned that it was not finding actual ownership in this case, it
provided strong precedent for customary landowners' abilities to assert
customary landowning rights. 51 By establishing such precedent, the Court
recognized and enforced the generally communal nature of customary
landowning rights.52 Thus, although there are a great many forms of
customary ownership, communal ownership provides a common framework.
2. Common Property Regimes Provide a Framework for These Varieties
of Customary Ownership
Customary owners of forestland in PNG use common property
regimes to allocate use rights between members.53 This means that their
forest resources are owned by an identified group of people invested with
the right to exclude others and the responsibility to maintain their resource.54
Clans have addressed the challenges of excludability and subtractibility 55 by
developing ownership schemes that involve long-run relations with many
reciprocal obligations. 56  Thus, property is not necessarily defined as the
right of persons over things, but as obligations owed between persons with
respect to things.57 For example, a clan may be able to assert their
ownership over a certain tract of trees if it had fulfilled its promise to a
downstream clan not to divert water. Similarly, a family may be able to
assert its rights to collect timber for building materials if it had participated
in guarding the forest. Such ownership provides an incentive structure that
enhances coordination, cooperation, and investment amongst resource-using
50 See id. citing In re Poriton 56 Morobe, [1971] P.N.G.L.R. 442.
51 See id.
52 See infra Part II.C.2 and note 130.
53 See WAGNER, supra note 10, at 2. Common property regimes are by far the dominant type of
property system in PNG and throughout the Pacific Islands. See id.
5 See S. Movik, Some Notes on Common vs. Private Property Rights to Natural Resources 3 (2004),
at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001447/00/MovikSome_040427-Paperl31.pdf (last visited Apr.
20, 2005). The rules of common property management regimes most often apply to a common pool
resource. ELINOR OSTRUM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 29 (1990). Common pool resources can be natural or man-made resource systems that
are large enough to make it costly to exclude others from using the resource. Id.
5 See S. Movik, supra note 54, at 3. Excludability refers to the costs of excluding non-owners
through physical barriers or legal instruments, while subtractibility involves the fact that benefits consumed
by one individual subtract from the benefits available to others. Id.
56 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 769 n.59. See also MAX GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE
JURISPRUDENCE 171-73 (1975).
" See id.
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groups to protect their forests, and reflects operational rules of indigenous
land use already in place.58
C. Illegal Logging Threatens to Destroy Unique Regions of Ecological
and Cultural Diversity in PNG and the Efficient and Equitable
Frameworks That Govern Them
Unsustainable logging dramatically affects local communities by
disrupting their customary forms of resource use.59  Among these
unsustainable practices, illegal logging is a catalyst for the most severe
forest degradation. 6° The logging industry uses earnings to finance further
access into the forest, leaving roads open for both large- and small-scale
loggers as well as landless cultivators who use slash and bum techniques.
6 1
Increased access to forest lands creates greater ecological disturbance such
as habitat fragmentation, watershed degradation, erosion, and local and
regional extinction.
62
In 1998, the forests of PNG faced a crisis caused by liquidation and
corruption. The government decided to liquidate large tracts of forest areas
in order to balance its budget, but allowed deficient logging practices,
ignorance of required logging procedures, and corruption to undermine
environmental sustainability. 63  As a result, customar landowners were
short-changed through the alienation of their resources. The groups most
affected were those living in the lowland and coastal areas where there is a
high concentration of commercially accessible timber.
65
58 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE: REGISTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 42
(Peter Larmour ed., The National Research Institute 1991) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE].
59 See THE WORLD BANK AND THE FORESTS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, THE WORLD BANK, at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAPUANEWGUINEA/Data%20and%20Reference/20211798/NB+
Forestry+Brief pdf (last visited on Apr. 20, 2005).
60 See generally CUT AND RUN, supra note 2, at 2-11.
61 Elli Louka, Cutting the Gordion Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only About
the Protection of the Environment, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 79, 93 (1996).
62 Curt Wilson, Comment, The 1995 Salvage Timber Sale Rider: A Recipe for Environmental
Devastation, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 419,423 (1996). See also, RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at
22. These destructive practices include feeder roads being constructed on a trial-and-error basis, little use
of directional felling techniques, excessive use of dozer and bulldozer blades, and failure to cut vines when
felling, which brings down smaller trees. Lack of adherence to environmental regulations, such as
disregarding restrictions on logging on slopes over thirty degrees, along watercourses, and other sensitive
ecosystems, results in soil compaction. This compaction prevents seedlings from taking root, causing
formation of excessive gaps in the canopy, altering micro-climates, and suppressing regrowth of valuable
species. Between thirty and seventy percent of residual trees suffer mortality as a consequence of logging
or the physiological stress following harvest. Id.
6 WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 2.
6 id.
65 See State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 249.
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In an attempt to halt this destruction and meet the conditions of a loan
from the World Bank, the PNG government issued a moratorium on any new
or extended timber permits.66  This moratorium was to last until National
Forest Authority evaluations found all current logging proposals to be in
accordance with the Forestry Act of 1991.67 The Forest Authority, however,
continued to issue permits for "road-line clearance[s]," setting up base
camps for "advance roading," and harvesting logs, all in direct breach of this
moratorium. 68  Recognizing that the moratorium was not an effective
mechanism to protect the forests, the government allowed the moratorium to
lapse in 2001, drawing both praise and criticism from all parties involved.69
Illegal logging is also linked with political corruption. Income from
the timber industry is a major source of funding for political parties and
politicians in PNG.70  At the national level, logging companies obtain the
right to log by bribing politicians and leaders, who in turn issue permits
outside of the established legal process for resource allocation.7  The
Independent Forestry Review, set up in response to the conditions of the
World Bank loan, found that of thirty proposed new concessions areas, four
were already being illegally logged and attempts had been made to illegally
72grant permission for logging in at least another ten areas. This endemic
corruption fuels environmental destruction and destroys the lives of PNG's
rural populations, who are losing their food sources and suffering the
negative social impacts of logging.73 Fortunately, customary ownership,
recognized by the Constitution of 1975 and numerous international
instruments, can mitigate the problems caused by illegal logging.74
66 See COLIN FILER, NAVROZ K. DUBASH & KILYALI KALrr, THE THIN GREEN LINE: WORLD BANK
LEVERAGE AND FOREST POLICY REFORM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 87 (The National Research Institute 2000).
67 Id. at 87.
68 See WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 8. In particular, customary owners feared
that these clearances and base camps would result in uncontrolled logging. Permission to conduct these
activities was revoked in both cases, but while deliberations occurred, over 21,000 square meters of logs
were cut. Id.
69 See Papua New Guinea NGOs Slam Government Over Logging Moratorium, FOREST
CONSERVATION NEWS TODAY, Dec. 9, 2001.
70 See Yati Bun, Corruption and the Forest Industry in Papua New Guinea, RADIO AUSTRALIA,
http://abc.net.au/timetotalk/english/opinionfrimeToTalkOpinion-440064.htm (last visited Apr. 20,2005).
71 Id.
72 id.
73 Id. See CUT AND RUN, supra note 2, at iv. See also WB SUSTAINING FORESTS, supra note 1,
appendix A-23. "Politically motivated and protected concessions usually exclude local populations,
especially indigenous forest dwellers, from using and benefiting from the forests." Id.
7 See State versus Custom, supra note 7, at 258.
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Ill. NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND UNDERDEVELOPED PROPERTY LAW
UNDERMINE CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR
CUSTOMARY OWNERSHIP
Constitutionally guaranteed customary land ownership, combined
with constitutional and international instruments, support customary owners'
rights of control over their resources. 5 However, the Forestry Act of 1991,
which restrains customary landowners' abilities to directly negotiate and
consult with commercial timber industries, severely weakens customary
ownership. Unclear definitions of customary ownership within the common
law further weaken indigenous groups' abilities to control their forests.76
Without formal definitions of customary ownership, a court may not
recognize indigenous groups' claims of ownership.
In order to make customary law effective as an instrument of
protection of indigenous rights to forest resources, PNG should revise the
Forestry Act of 1991, and the land courts should develop a clear legal basis
for customary ownership through mediation and adjudication. Recognizing
the rights of forest communities allows the communities to make resource
allocation decisions about the resources they are most dependent upon, and
can be effective in protecting the forests, biodiversity and indigenous
peoples of PNG. The Constitution provides the foundations of customary
ownership in PNG and numerous international instruments give further
support.
A. The Constitution Recognizes Customary Ownership as One of the
Central Elements of Papua New Guinean Law
Customary law applies to ninety-seven percent of the land in PNG.
The principles of custom were adopted at independence by the Constitution
of 1975. 77 Schedule 2.1 of the Constitution adopts custom as part of the
underlying substantive law along with the principles and rules of common
law and equity. 78 Customary law applies to any appropriate matter, as long
as it is not "repugnant" to the Constitution, statute, or general principles of
75 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at vi. See also Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, supra note 11.76 See generally Cooter, supra note 13, at 773. "The formalization of customary law by the land
courts has not proceeded far enough to eliminate the uncertainties and risks attending these transactions."
Id.
77 PAPUA N.G. CONST. sch. 2.1, 2.2.
78 Id.
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humanity.79 Supreme Court and National Court decisions have incorporated
custom into the common law of property by reconciling constitutional and
legislative intent with substantive customary law.
80
The Constitutional recognition of custom is the key policy
consideration influencing forest use. 81  The Fourth and Fifth Goals of the
Constitution call for the "natural resources and environment to be conserved
and used for the collective benefit of us all, to be replenished for the benefit
of future generations, 82 and for development "primarily through the use of
Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic
organizations. 8 3  Recognition of custom occurs in several other sections of
the Constitution, providing the foundation for customary ownership in
84PNG. In addition, indigenous rights to control resources are also supportedby international law.
B. Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Is Currently a Central
Theme in International Law
Contemporary international concern for indigenous peoples
acknowledges the "importance of land and resources to the survival of
indigenous cultures, and, by implication, to indigenous self-
determination." 85 Several declarations and covenants lay the foundation for
this concern. This includes the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, which protects various individuals and groups from
79 id.
80 See generally Ene Land Group Inc. v. Fonsen Logging (PNG) Pty Ltd and GR Logging Pty Ltd,
[1998] P.G.N.C. 9; Re Hides Gas Project Land, [1993] P.N.G.L.R. 309; Auguste Olei v. The Provincial
Land Court at Port Moresby [1984] P.NG.L.R. 295; State v. Giddings [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423; Ex Parte
Tiakon Koan for the Ambai Clan of Laiagam, [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423; Allan Sannga, Peter Timereke v.
Duncan Farria and Anor, [1983] P.N.G.L.R. 142 (maintaining that customary law develops from time to
time and may evolve its own customary rules to 'modem' property such as shares in a company). See
Kenneth Brown, Customary Law in the Pacific: An Endangered Species?, J. SOUTH PAC. L. 8 n.31 (1999),
available at http:/lwww.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/journalsplaw/articles/Brownl.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
.. RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at iv.
82 PAPUA N.G. CONST., National Goals and Directive Princs., Goal IV (1975).
" Id. Goal V.
84 See generally PAPUA N.G. CONST., Preamble, §45 (religion); §53(5)(d) (disallowing the
acquisition of customarily owned land); §54 (special provisions in regards to certain lands); §67 (eligibility
for naturalization requires respect for the customs and cultures of the country); §78 (adoption); §130
(integrity of candidates); §171 (authorizing Parliament to establish other courts intended to deal with
matters primarily by custom or in accordance with customary procedures); sch. 1.2(l)(b) (defining custom);
sch. 2.3(l)(c) (establishing that where there is no underlying law, the National and Supreme Courts have a
duty to draw analogies from custom), and sch. 2.11 (providing that court decisions overturning custom may
not be applied retroactively).
85 Anaya, supra note 5, at 35.
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86
state acts that may deprive them of property. The U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has called upon the states to provide
indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for sustainable economic and
social development compatible with cultural characteristics. 87  PNG
answered this call by ratifying the International Covenant on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965.88 Specifically, it provides
that no decisions directly relating to indigenous peoples' rights and interests
can be taken without their informed consent.89
A prominent international affirmation of indigenous rights, cultural
integrity, and group identity is the International Labor Organization's
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal People.90 Article 14(1) of this
Convention recognizes the collective character of indigenous ownership
rights, affirming that "the rights of ownership and possession of [indigenous
peoples] over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be
recognised." 91  Articles 15(1) and 15(2) require states to safeguard
indigenous peoples' rights to "participate in the use, management and
conservation of their resources," asserting that they have a say in any
exploration or extraction on their lands, a right to benefit from those
activities, and a right to a process of consultation in regards to any resource
86 Jacqueline F. Pruner, Comment, Aboriginal Title and Extinguishment Not So "Clear and Plain":
A Comparison of the Current Marori and Haida Experiences, 14 PAc RIM LAW & POL'Y J. 253, 257-58
(2005). See also U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Comm., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/]ang/eng.htm (last visited Apr.
20, 2005).
87 See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106XX, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005). See also Anaya, supra note 5, at 19.
88 See U.N. Development Program Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/
cty/cty_fPNG.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). PNG ratified this covenant on Feb. 26, 1982. See also
U.N., Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HCHR, available
at http:llwww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
9 Id. See also Anaya, supra note 5, at 19.
90 Anaya, supra note 5, at 23. The provisions of The International Labor Organization's ("ILO")
Convention No. 169 of 1989 have been framed with the cooperation of the United Nations; the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the U.N.; the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the
World Health Organization. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (No. 169), U.N. Gen. Conf. of the International Labor Organization, Sess. 67 (1991) [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 169].
9' ILO Convention No. 169, art. 14(1).
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extraction that may in some way affect their lives.92 While PNG has yet to
sign this Convention, several NGOs are advocating for its ratification.
93
The Convention on Biodiversity ("CBD") further represents the
international community's commitment to the preservation of biodiversity
and indigenous rights. The CBD, by identifying the problem of dwindling
diversity, sets overall goals, policies, and general obligations, as well as
organizes technical and financial coordination.94 As a party to the CBD,
PNG is obliged to develop a national biodiversity strategy and action plan,
and file reports on efforts to implement treaty commitments.95  Several
articles of the Convention lay out the requirements for a biodiversity plan,
including protection of indigenous peoples' practices. Though the execution
of each requirement is "subject to" the legislation of the state,96 Article HI
affirms the responsibility of member states to ensure that "activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of other areas beyond the limits of [their] national jurisdiction.
Recognizing the global consequences of the loss of biodiversity, this
provision allows for national sovereignty, but also checks potential abuse by
requiring accountability in an international context. 9
8
Other international plans and policies have developed guidelines and
examples for strengthening the role of indigenous peoples in their
communities. Despite the international community's recognition of
indigenous ownership rights, customary ownership in PNG is limited by the
Forestry Act of 1991.
92 Id. arts. 15(1), 15(2), and 6(2). See also Manuela Tomei & Lee Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 8 (Int'l Labor Org. 1996), at http://labordoc.ilo.org/cgi-
bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v1=1&ti= 1,1 &SearchArg=Tomei&SL=None&SearchCode=NAME_&PID=13507&
CNT=30&HC=7&SEQ=20050506194221&SID=7 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
93 John Scott Murphy, "Indigenous People - What's in a Name?" Australia Human Rights Centre
(Aug. 24, 1995), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/ahric/hrd/August95/indig.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005).
94 Kunich, supra note 22, at 187.
95 Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc DPI/1307, arts. 7, 26, available at http://www.biodiv.org/
docAea1cbd-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity].
G.F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments
for Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 211 (1998). This is a very broad
qualification.
97 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 95, art. 3.
98 Kunich, supra note 22, at 189.
PACIFIC RIm LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
C. The Forestry Act of 1991 Curtails the Sovereignty of Customary
Ownership
The Forestry Act of 1991 ("the Act") restrains customary owners'
constitutional right to directly negotiate and consult with commercial timber
industries. The PNG government enacted this law to protect landowning
groups from manipulation and abuse in direct, unchecked negotiations with
logging companies.99 To achieve this protection, the Act implemented
government control over allocation of timber rights, creating an intermediary
between the customary owners and commercial timber companies. Despite
its goals, the Act has many adverse effects and warrants a revision to
strengthen customary ownership rights.
1. While Well-Intentioned, the Act Removes Customary Landowners
from Decisions Impacting Their Forests
A history of excessive forest extraction led to the need to protect
customary landowners from the unscrupulous dealings of loggers.1l° In
response to this need for protection, Parliament enacted the Forestry Act of
1991.101 This Act prescribes a process of "resource acquisition" in which
the National Forest Authority enters into a Forest Management Agreement
("FMA") with customary landowners.10 2 Under the FMA, the State will
manage the forests for a "term of sufficient duration in order to allow for
proper forest management measures to be carried out to completion. 1 °3
99 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 180.
'-o State versus Custom, supra note 7, at 250. In 1989, the Barnett Commission of Inquiry
documented an "out of control" timber industry tainted by pervasive corruption, transfer pricing, and
reckless logging practices. The potential for logging companies to abuse and manipulate landowning
companies was attributed in part to the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act of 1971 and the Forestry Act
(Amalgated) of 1973. These acts allowed either unchecked direct dealings with timber-harvesters or
government restrictions imposed without consideration of the customary landowners, and were repealed by
the Forestry Act of 1991. See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 3-10.
101 See JIM FINGLETON, REGIONAL STUDY ON PACIFIC ISLANDS FORESTRY LEGISLATION, FAO LEGAL
PAPERS ONLINE No. 30, 5-6 (June 2002) [hereinafter Fingleton on Forestry Legislation]. The Act has been
revised a number of times, first by the Forestry Act (Amendment) of 1993, and further amendments in 1996
and 2000. The 1991 Act remains the main forestry law, and amendments have been taken into account. Id.
at 12.
,02 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 180. Allowances are made for FMAs to be executed by
the "authorized agents" of the owners, provided that seventy-five percent of the adult resident members of
the landowning groups give their written consent. Id. See also Forestry Act of 1991, Part III, Div. 4, §§
56(1) and 57(2)(b) (Papua N.G.).
103 Forestry Act of 1991, Part III, Div. 4, §58(d) (Papua N.G.).
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The National Forest Authority's virtual monopoly over the acquisition
of harvesting rights' °4 through FMAs creates numerous problems. First,
because the National Forest Authority is concerned with ensuring an
adequate timber supply to maintain the industrial base of the timber industry,
most FMAs do not specifically ensure the sustainability of forests.'
0 5
Second, even if appropriate provisions for sustainability are incorporated
into the FMA, the National Forest Authority often lacks the capacity or will
to regulate vast tracts of forest. 0 6 Third, even after entering the FMA with
the indigenous landowning groups ("Land Groups"), 10 7 the National Forest
Authority accepts proposals from commercial logging companies.
108
Submitted proposals for timber permits must meet Project Guidelines, which
are developed in consultation with the customary landowners.'0 Once
proposals are submitted, however, the evaluations of these proposals do not
include consultation with the customary owners, especially if the boundaries
of the Timber Permit Area do not correspond to the area covered by one,
single clan of landowners. 110 As a result of this exclusion, the landowners
do not have legal control over which timber company holds the permit, the
104 See Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 20.
'05 LYNNE ARMITAGE, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: STATUS AND PROSPECTS,
8(2001).
'0 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at viii. This is evidenced by continued permitting of logging
outside of the requirements of the Act and newspaper headlines that reveal numerous violations of forest
law and customary ownership. See, e.g., supra note 68, for a description of illegal permitting in the Kiung-
Aiambak customary lands, as well as the Pondo and Tuwapu areas; RENNER supra note 6, at 14; see also
Alex Rheeney, Maintain Forestry Review Report in its Entirety, PNG POST-COURIER, Aug. 18, 2004
available at LEXIS, Allwld File; NGO calls ECP help, PNG POST-COURIER, Sept. 10, 2004, available at
LEXIS, Allwld File; Outrage at Teak Export, PNG POST-COURIER, May 17, 2004, available at LEXIS,
Allwld File.
107 State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 250. Indigenous landowning groups can incorporate under
the Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974. See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 180-81. Through
this device, clans became legal corporations run according to customary law. Id. Title to the land must be
vested in these groups or registered under a law providing for the registration of title to customary land. Id.
In situations in which this is "impractical," allowance is made for the FMA to be executed by "authorized
agents" of the owners, provided that seventy-five percent of the adult resident members of the landowning
groups have given their written consent. Id.
0 See Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 5.
10' Forestry Act of 1991, Part III, Div. 5, § 63 (1-3). Project Guidelines are developed through
Development Options Studies, Forestry Act of 1991, Part III, Div. 5, Subdiv. A, § 62. The government's
record on fulfilling the mandates of the Development Options Studies is poor, as it has failed to carry out
any form of study that meets the requirement that it must make a preliminary assessment of the likely
socioeconomic impact of the project so that the landowners can make informed decisions. See State Versus
Custom, supra note 7, at 253. Further, any application for timber permits must be accompanied by an
environmental plan approved under the Environmental Planning Act. Forestry Act of 1991, Part 111, Div. 5,
Subdiv. C, § 77. Inadequate funding and capacity curtail implementation of the environmental plans. See
Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 36. Although PNG has one of the most elaborate
systems for forestry sector planning, it may be so complex that it is unlikely to produce its intended
benefits. Id. at 15-16, 32.110 RENNER, supra note 6, at 16.
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type and amount of infrastructure the timber company is to construct, or the
rate at which timber is harvested."'1 They also lack the freedom to negotiate
royalties. 12 Finally, they are subject to license transfers, a banned practice
that continues due to lack of enforcement." 
3
Perhaps the most troubling effect of the Act involves the redefinition
of customary leadership roles. Leaders of indigenous landowning groups
think that the reform process threatens their leadership positions within their
own communities.' 14 They believe they are nothing more than the puppets
of logging companies and can no longer claim to represent the interests of
their communities.' 15  Despite this perceived lack of control, leaders of
indigenous landowning groups do not challenge logging companies because
the companies continue to offer lucrative profits to the indigenous groups."
6
Thus, their leadership decisions fail to meet the resource and social needs of
the communities. 17 This scenario has been repeated time and again in many
developing countries faced with reconciling customary law and formal
statutory law. 18  Upending the local institutional roles and regulations
already in place has intensified the debates over power and authority and
increased the competition for now commercially valuable resources." 
9
Faced with state-imposed limits on control over their resources, local
landowning groups are advocating for increased strength of their ownership
of forest resources.' 20  They seek the security of customary ownership and
Id. at 17.
112 ROBERT MrrCHELL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND MANAGEMENT OF
FARMLAND AND FORESTS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTrruTE, 37 (2004). Instead of royalties, a log export
tax is imposed on the timber concessionaires. Id. The government shares a portion of the revenue with
customary landowners, but this is at most twelve percent of the market value of logs, a highly inequitable
distribution. Id.
113 See Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 37. Logging companies perform
company takeovers, in which they obtain a license through legal means, but then sell all of their shares to a
different company that is not subject to the license agreements. Customary owners then find strangers
cutting the forests on their customary lands, with no adherence to the Project Guidelines. Id.
114 See generally Simpson, G., 'Get What You Can While You Can': The Landowner-Government
Relationship in West New Britain, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREST MANAGEMENT IN PAPUA NEW
GUINEA 17, 33 (Colin Filer, ed., 1996).
"' Id. at 33.
116 See Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 34.
"' Id. at 33.
18 See Raja Devasish Roy, Challenges for Juridical Pluralism and Customary Laws of Indigenous
Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 113, 158
(2004).
119 David Mosse, From State Bureaucracy to People's Participation: A New Moral Economy for
Water?, in THE RULE OF WATER: STATECRAFT, ECOLOGY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOUTH INDIA 288
(2003).
120 ARMITAGE, supra note 105, at 4.
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freedom from restrictions in negotiation. Several existing mechanisms can
facilitate these goals.
2. The PNG Government Should Revise the Forestry Act of 1991 to Give
Customary Forestland Owners Legally-Enforceable Rights
The Act should allow customary forest landowners to self-determine
their development paths through direct negotiation with logging companies
that result in legally-enforceable contracts. As the law currently stands,
there is no legal relationship and no privity of contract between the local
landowners and forest rights purchasers. 122  Not only are the local
landowners excluded from final negotiations over the timber rights, but they
also cannot sue for any breach of concession agreements, even though such
breach affects their own forests.123 Thus, revisions to the Act must lift the
restrictions on direct dealings between customary owners and commercial
timber companies. 124
Lifting these restrictions will allow direct negotiations, which can help
local landowners to acquire political, administrative, and technical skills. 2
Giving appropriate information and professional advice to the customary
landowners is essential.126 To balance negotiation inequities and strengthen
customary landowners' bargaining power, legislation must support, rather
than supplant, custom. 27  Because customary ownership is often held
communally, group decision-making processes will check direct
negotiations, raising the transaction costs of development and slowing the
rush to sell valuable resources. 128 If customary law requires an individual to
seek the clan's permission in order to sell his land, and that individual
ignores this law, the sale is typically considered void. 129 Furthermore, land
121 See generally RENNER, supra note 6, at 74-76.
122 See WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 19. Privity of contract is defined as the
relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party
from doing so. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (Second Pocket Ed. 2001).
'23 See WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 4, at 19.124 COLIN HUNT, PRODUCTION, PRIVATIZATION AND PRESERVATIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
FORESTRY iii (Colin Hunt ed., 2002).
125 See State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 266.
126 See Fingleton on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 35.127 State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 258. Legislation already in place allows investigation into
the fairness of dealings done under the forestry laws repealed by the Forestry Act of 1991. See Fingleton
on Forestry Legislation, supra note 101, at 34.128 Cooter, supra note 13, at 787.
129 id.
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court cases suggest that respecting the equities of a dispute by adhering to
custom provides cooperation and development in the long run.
30
Revisions allowing direct negotiations based on group decision-
making processes can meet many needs. Customary groups may negotiate
(or renegotiate) the basic conditions of project development, especially the
priorities for social and economic infrastructure.' 3' They may formulate and
apply rules for the distribution of project revenues earmarked for the benefit
of the entire community.' 32 Furthermore, revising the Act would facilitate
local monitoring of the developers' compliance with timber permits and
environmental planning conditions and would enable customary owners to
seek compensation for any breaches of such conditions. 133 Finally, direct
negotiations could enable customary landowners to lobby the government or
the developer for greater community access to project employment or
business development opportunities. 34
Revising the Act in order to meet the aforementioned needs of
customary landowners is essential, but it cannot happen in a framework of
underdeveloped customary property law.' 35 Resolving claims to land and
disputes about development between customary landowning groups is
crucial to strengthening customary ownership rights. The Land Disputes
Settlements Act of 1975 created a system of courts to resolve disputes
involving land under customary ownership. Both the procedural customary
law and substantive customary property law of these courts, however,
require further development.
3
D. Underdevelopment of Customary Ownership Rights Currently Limits
the Land Courts' Ability to Enforce Them
Problems arise when deciding who actually owns land under
customary law. The Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974 allows
indigenous people to form a Land Group in order to enter an FMA with the
130 Id. at 788, n.82. To illustrate, two parties developed a joint cattle project on marginal riverine
swampland over which village pigs formerly enjoyed free range. The land later increased in value because
it proved suitable for a coffee plantation. Each of the two parties claimed it, but the magistrate held that
they had an equal interest in it, so development would require cooperation between them. id.
131 See KATHY WHIMP, DECONSTRUCTING INCORPORATION: INDIGENOUS LAND OWNERS AND
REPRESENTATION IN PNG AND AUSTRALIA 16 (1998).
132 id.
133 id.
134 id.
135 Cooter, supra note 13, at 773. "The formalization of customary law by the land courts has not
proceeded far enough to eliminate the uncertainties and risks attending these transactions." Id.
136 Id.
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National Forest Authority. This FMA must now be made pursuant to the
Forestry Act of 1991.137 Registering a Land Group does not involve any
adjudication regarding the ownership of land.138 Thus, the National Forest
Authority risks entering a legal contract for the purchase of timber rights
from land that may only belong to the customary landowners through color
of their own assertion.' 39  Substantive law regarding the determination of
ownership of this land has only begun to take shape, with local land courts
facilitating the effort.'40
1. The System of the Local Land Courts, Although Well-Established and
Sensitive to the Customs of Different Localities, Requires Further
Refinement
The Land Disputes Settlement Act created a system of courts to
resolve land disputes involving land under customary ownership.'
41
Claimants bring suits before an appointed panel of mediators. 4 2  They are
usually indigenous, elderly men with little formal education, who command
great respect due to their knowledge of unique rules and principles of
custom in their region. 43 If a settlement seems possible after hearing the
two sides of a dispute, the mediators may propose one. 44 If accepted, this
settlement could be the end of the legal process.
45
If unsuccessful, mediators may refer the dispute to the local land
courts. 146 In land courts, a magistrate presides along with mediators, and
reviews the case de novo. 147 Although these are new mediators, close
community ties and communication mean that people sitting on the court
137 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
38 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 182. Incorporation of a land group is not recognition of an
award of customary title. Id.
139 RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 182.
14o See e.g., State v. Giddings [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423; Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] P.N.G.L.R.
309; Ene Land Group Inc. v. Fonsen Logging [1998] P.G.N.C. 9; Tomu for and on behalf of Luhalipu Clan
of Samberigi, Southern Highlands Province and Jimmy Kenotiki Kinobu for and on behalf of Imawe Kew
Clan of Kaiama No 2 Village, Kikori, Gulf Province v. The Independent State of Papua New Guinea,
Winton Sale [19961 P.N.G.L.R. 101.
"4 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 35.
142 Id. Lawyers are usually excluded in order to keep proceedings simple and non-technical. Id.
Exclusion of lawyers also ensures that traditional people will have access to the proceedings and the
decisions will be intelligible. Id. Provincial Land Dispute Committees appoint these mediators. Id.
:43 Cooter, supra note 13, at 788.
' CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 35.
145 id.
146 id.
147 Id.
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often have knowledge of the dispute. 148 Not only must these courts record
boundaries, but they must also make explicit, authoritative statements of
customary law.14 9 If resolution does not come from the local land courts,
parties may appeal to the provincial land courts, which require a fee. 50 A
provincial court will examine the written record and call witnesses.' 5'
The National Court hears appeals, but on a limited basis because this
court has general, rather than just land, jurisdiction.' 52 The strongest basis
for appeal is that the provincial court departed from its statutory mandate in
deciding a case.' 53 The National Court sees its role as overseeing the Land
Dispute Settlement Act, not interpreting custom, and has decided that
customary principles should be given substantive weight.
154
Several improvements are necessary to expedite the development of
customary property law in PNG. First, magistrates need further training in
common-law methods. 155 Second, the ban on lawyers should be lifted, as
many members of customary groups have been or could be trained as
lawyers. 156  Finally, these courts also need customary management to
actually function as intended. A clan leader in East Sepik Province stated:
The fact is today that customary management is in dire need of
improvement. The young men have a grasp of the problems but
they don't have confidence in the elders who can be
bamboozled into making decisions that are not in the long term
interest of the clan. These discussions can be spurred by greed
or even misguided respect for application of land, timber rights,
etc. by rich and powerful people like National Ministers for
example. Incorporation of Land Groups will give them a
chance to develop decision making by committee, which will
give an opportunity for the younger men. Just as customary
law can be developed so also decision-making systems can be
improved. 1
57
Enforcement of customary ownership by the local land courts will prove
148 id.
149 Cooter, supra note 13, at 786.
50 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 35.
151 Id.
52 Id. at 36.
13 Id. at 35.
1s4 See State v. Giddings [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 423.
155 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 790.
'- See id.
'17 See id. at 789 n.84.
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useless unless the rules of management are appropriate for the resource.
2. Mediation and Adjudication of Land Disputes in the Land Courts
Furthers the Needed Development of Customary Ownership of Forest
Resources
Despite the needed improvements, advantages of the local land courts
allow them to perform adjudicative functions better than the political
representatives in Parliament. Magistrates, who often do not serve in their
home province, can act as disinterested parties, have fewer incentives to
acquire power, have more local information based on the local land courts'
records, and more legal expertise.158 Furthermore, local courts are neutral
arenas in which customary owners determine for themselves their own forms
of ownership and development.
159
This local land court system is an appropriate, well-used, and
functional mechanism capable of integrating customary ownership into the
modem property regime of PNG 160  Between 1976 and 1987, official
statistics report an average of sixty-three disputes decided per year by the
local land courts, with provincial land courts deciding an average of thirteen
disputes per year.' 61 The requirement that land courts make explicit and
authoritative statements on customary law also provides an example of the
courts' ability to base decisions on unique aspects of custom. For instance, a
magistrate in the highlands decided that land surrounded on three sides by
the relatives of one of the disputants belonged to that disputant because only
he could defend it.' 62  A magistrate in the case of Mundua Imbo and
Damatagl Endemongo cited another determinative principle in 1982: "There
is little point in a Land Court awarding a piece of land to a group if they will
be unable to use it [due to] intimidation or other pressures from rival
11163groups. Similarly, a different magistrate ordered the owner of land to
compensate the evicted trespasser to avoid further harassment by the
trespasser and "his men." 164
The decisions of these courts make sense in their local context. They
158 Id. at 792.
159 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 46.
'60 See BERNARD NAROKOBI, Lo BILONG YuMI YET: LAW AND CUSTOM IN MELANESIA 12-13 (Ron
Crocombe et al. eds., 2003). Mr. Narokobi suggests that the area of land tenure was clearly defined in
customary law.161 Id.
162 Id. at 786.
163 Id. at 787.
164 Cooter, supra note 13, at 787.
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reflect the unique rules and obligations of customary ownership that
appropriately allocate land and resources. They represent a decentralized
forum of resource management. The next section explores why these forms
of management have survived, their adaptability to changing circumstances,
and their potential to protect the forests of PNG from illegal logging.
IV. STRONGER CUSTOMARY OWNERSHIP OF FORESTS CAN BE EFFECTIVE
AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PROTECT FORESTS FROM ILLEGAL LOGGING
Customary ownership, as a form of common property management, is
an appropriate resource-allocation system for the forests of PNG because it
provides an equitable and efficient mechanism for customary landowners to
protect their forests. Customary landowners have, throughout history and
though current popular protests, resisted attempts to convert customary
ownership to freehold title. 165 As an adaptable form of relational property
with obligations to current and future clan members,' 66 customary ownership
restrains decision-making processes, thus slowing the rush to sell valuable
resources and instead encouraging investment in and protection of forests.
A. Customary Ownership Has Survived Attempts to Convert It to
Freehold Title
Colonial policies attempted to eliminate customary land tenure, but
failed to establish freehold title when faced with customary owners'
continuing adherence to customary ownership practices.' 67 In response to
the failure of establishing freehold title and increased land disputes, the
Australian administration created the Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters in 1972.168 Membership was entirely indigenous and served to
reassert primacy of customary title.1 69 Subsequently, the enactment of the
165 Freehold title is "an estate in land held in fee simple, fee tail, or for term of life." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 295 (Second Pocket Ed. 2001).
'66 See Part IV.B.I, infra, for a discussion of relational property.
167 See RESOURCE OWNERS, supra note 9, at 30. In order to facilitate use of their land as security for
commercial credit, the Land Tenure (Conversion) Act of 1963 allowed members of customary landowning
communities to obtain individual freehold title by mutual agreement with their fellow members. Id. It also
allowed the Land Title Commission to demarcate and register the title of customary landowning groups.
id. This Act did not have the intended effect of liberating large amounts of land and only increased the
amount of land disputes, which stalled any sort of use of the land and lacked a mechanism for adjudication.
Id.
168 Id. at 30.
'69 Id. at 30-31.
VOL. 14 No. 2
APRIL 2005 INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY OWNERSHIP OF FORESTS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 569
Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974,170 along with the previously
mentioned Land Disputes Settlement Act of 1975, facilitated the return of
alienated land to indigenous title. 17 1 This resurgence of customary title (as
opposed to freehold title which is inconsistent with traditionally communal
forms of ownership), 172 the requirements for group negotiations, and the
establishment of local dispute resolution procedures has ensured a place for
indigenous forms of production, culture, and identity.
1 73
Current popular sentiment in PNG reflects the importance of
customary ownership as common property. In 2003, violent protests erupted
in the capital of Port Moresby against an amendment to the Customary Land
Act which would require registration of customary lands and produced fear
that customary owners' rights to land would be undercut. 174 Conversion to
freehold title is generally regarded as a political and economic failure. 175  In
fact, most of the recent work of the Land Titles Commission has been
reversion, in which customary landowners assert challenges to the
agreements allocating their land in the first place. 1
76
B. Customary Ownership Curtails Unsustainable Practices and Provides
an Adaptable Framework for Changing Circumstances
The group decision-making processes of customary ownership slow
down those who are eager to sell timber rights for development, while
170 Id. at 31. This Act allows indigenous people to form a landowner company in order to enter a
FMA with the National Forest Authority. Id. Because the Act does not require identification of the land or
the clan members in order to register, logging companies, anxious to streamline the process, are able to
short-cut the procedures, but may end up entering a legally-binding contract with people whose ownership
of land is only based on their assertions. Id. at 182.
171 Id. at 3 1.
172 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 760. Cooter notes that the wholesale conversion of rural land to
freehold is tremendously disruptive to the economy and life of the countryside. Id.
171 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 2. See also Minh Day, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Customary Law: Resolving Property Disputes in Post-Conflict Nations, a Case Study of
Rwanda, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 235, 250 (2001). "An effective dispute resolution model that incorporates
[alternative dispute resolution] and customary law is less an imposition of a new modality than a retaining
of existing practices." Id.
174 Kalinga Seneviratne, Development: Papua New Guinea Wants to Prove Skeptics Wrong, Inter
Press Service/Global Information Network, Dec. 15, 2003. See also Joel M. Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role
of Private Property in Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological Issue Raised by Land Registration,
25 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 467, 471-72 (2004). Professor Ngugi points out that while land registration is a
technical exercise, it is also used to accomplish hidden political motives. Id. He goes on to note that
capturing customary rights is often done with the aim of transforming the rights of various groups, using
Kenya as an example. Id. While the government envisioned complete commodification of the land, certain
sectors refused to accept the near absolute powers of the individually registered owners. Id. Instead, they
organized, invented, and mobilized customary norms to frustrate formalized registration. Id.
:75 See Cooter, supra note 13, at 779.
176 See id. at 778.
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providing an adaptable framework for long-term cooperation and
development. As a form of relational property that creates obligations to
current and future relationships, customary ownership curbs unsustainable
practices and accommodates changing circumstances.
1. Customary Ownership Is a Form of "Relational Property" That
Serves Indigenous Groups More Appropriately Than "Market
Properly"
In PNG, many customary land transactions take place between
relatives. 177 The "web of mutual obligations" that binds people together in
their indigenous kin networks constrains a seller's freedom to pursue his or
her best advantage. 178 In contrast, in the common law countries from which
PNG draws its formal legal framework, most land transactions are between
people who only relate to each other on a commercial level, under a freehold
regime that works best when parties do not have strong commitments to
each other.
179
Relational property rules maintain an incentive structure where, in the
long run, cooperation benefits everyone, while non-cooperation benefits no
one.1 80  Thus, self-interested people can still cooperate with one another
through this community-enhancing framework.181  The relationships within
indigenous groups serve as this framework, creating a complicated, yet
flexible and familiar understanding between parties making decisions
regarding the use of their forests.' 82  Thus, rather than working within a
"market property" system, which enables strangers to transfer property
rights in one-shot transactions, forest user groups work best within a
framework of coordination and cooperation, creating "relational property"
among kin.
183
177 CUSTOMARY LAND TENuRE, supra note 5 8, at 41.
178 Id.
179 Id. These countries include Australia and the United States. Id.
"0 Id. at 42.
... Id. at 42.
182 Cooter, supra note 13, at 773. "An understanding supplies a vague, uncertain and flexible basis
for coordination and cooperation. The parties rely on informal means of interpretation and enforcement,
and they adjust the terms of the understanding in response to changing conditions." Id. In contrasting
understandings with contracts, Robert Cooter points out that understandings may be preferable to contracts
for a variety of reasons, including those parties who are in long-run relationships. Id. at 774. He uses game
theory's demonstration that repeated play can solve problems of opportunism that occur in one-shot
contracts. Thus, commitment to a long-run relationship may be superior to binding, legal agreements in the
right circumstances. Id.
183 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 42.
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2. The Obligations to Current and Future Relationships Amongst Clan
Members Curtails Illegal Practices
Unlike Western societies, where mutual obligations are minimal, the
definitions of customary property law do not involve a person's right over
things, but rather, obligations owed between persons in respect of things.
1 84
These obligations are to those within kinship groups, which in the context of
land includes children and ancestors. 8 5 Extending relational property law to
include these future generations curtails illegal logging practices, as the
current users have customary obligations to maintain the resource for their
children. 186  The Constitution of PNG also supports guardianship of
resources for future generations. 87 Further, "[i]t is no exaggeration to say
that a clan's land is sacred, since its dead have been buried in it from time
immemorial."' 8  Thus, indigenous groups possess the desire and incentive
to protect their land out of respect for their ancestors and in order to
maintain a resource base for future generations.
3. The Adaptability of Customary Ownership Enables It to Accommodate
Changing Circumstances
Customary ownership's capacity for change arises from its origins as189
a practical interaction between kinsmen. Like a language that evolved out
of the necessity to trade with other cultures (for example, Adzera or Yabem,
which are Austronesian languages spoken within PNG),1 90 customary
ownership evolved along with the necessity to allocate resources amongst
related members of a clan. New situations required accomplishing
spontaneous responses capable of addressing the situation without a formal
set of procedures as to how to change the rules. 19' Recognition of a change
:84 GLUCKMAN, supra note 56, at 171.
185 ARMITAGE, supra note 105, at 3-5. In fact, the role of land is to ensure the survival of the clans
traditionally through a high level of self-sufficiency. Id. at 3.
116 Anastasia Telesetsky, Graun Bilong Mipela Na Mipela No Tromweim: The Viability of
International Conservation Easements to Protect Papua New Guinea's Declining Biodiversity, 13 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 735, 752 (2001). "As an important part of their worldview, New Guineans generally
associate both their given communal and individual rights to a piece of land with customary responsibilities
to maintain the land." Id.
'87 PAPUA N.G. CONST., National Goals and Directive Princs., Goal V (1975).
lSS Cooter, supra note 13, at 772.
89 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 39.
190 The Rosetta Project, Long Now Foundation, Stanford University Libraries, http://www.rosetta
project.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
191 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE, supra note 58, at 39.
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in custom by the local land court in Rabual provides an example.1 92
According to Tolai custom before 1953, leaders of the clan could decide
whether to sell that clan's land. 19 3 As population pressure increased land
values, the Tolai became alarmed that leaders were disposing of clan land
for their own personal profits. 94  In order to address their concerns,
customary law was changed and enforced by the courts. 195 Now, clan land
cannot be sold without the agreement of all the affected members. 196 This
demonstrates that substantial popular support for change in customary law
can motivate the courts to respond accordingly.
Unlike statutory law, which tends to be inflexible, customary law is
open to flexible interpretation by the newer generations, whose values and
needs may change. 197 Thus, customary owners are more likely to accept and
enforce customary law when they know that it can be adapted to fit the
realities of their changing circumstances.1 98  This adaptability allows
customary ownership to be dynamic and responsive to the specific needs of
the locality as circumstances change and development pressures increase. 199
C. Recognition of Indigenous Rights of Resource Management
Dramatically Increases the Protection of Forests
Durable and ecologically sound resource management institutions are
valuable in and of themselves and are even more valuable when they
internalize norms of resource use that are consistent with the public
interest.200 Local management of natural resources works most efficiently
and effectively when rural communities, rather than the state, are involved in
making their own investment decisions.2°' Many case studies investigate the
decentralization of resource management, indicating the success of these
allocative structures. 20 2 Examples of such decentralization in PNG include
192 Cooter, supra note 13, at 788.
193 Id.
1' Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Telesetsky, supra note 186, at 759.
'9 See id.
199 Cooter, supra note 13, at 788.
200 Gregory Hicks & Devon G. Pena, Community Acequias in Colorado's Culebra Watershed: A
Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 COLO. L. REV. 387, 388 (2003).
201 See AGARWAL AND NARAIN, surpra note 3, at 7.
202 See e.g., JESSE C. RIBOT, DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WORLD
RESOURCES INsTrTE (MARTHA SCHULTZ ED., 2002); AUGUSTA MOLNAR, ET AL., WHO CONSERVES THE
WORLD'S FORESTS? COMMUNITY-DRIVEN STRATEGIES TO PROTECT FORESTS AND RESPECT RIGHTS,
FOREST TRENDS (2004).
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the Integrated Conservation and Development pilot sites at Lak and
Ramu.2 °3
The failure of the Lak pilot and the success of the Ramu pilot
demonstrate that the most successful programs give full information to
landowners and build consensus around development options. 2° These pilot
sites, combined with case studies from around the world, "show that open
and participatory village institutions which have been given clearly defined
property rights, remain the best institutions to manage conflict and determine
burden- and benefit-sharing within communities. ' '2° 5 Landowners involved
in negotiations with the timber industry have retained their land and have
generally not been displaced from their traditional villages.2 °6  Further, a
process that allocates resources in a more participatory and accountable way
contributes to better forest management and reduces social conflict.20 7 Thus,
customary landowners have also been successful in some regions when
establishing their own development projects, such as small-scale forestry
projects. 208 They recognize that while their forests give them access to the
monetary sector, they are also valuable resources that must be sustained and
protected for future generations.20 9
Furthermore, because they are dependent upon their forests,
customary owners with recognized rights are effective protectors of their
resource. As noted earlier, many groups in PNG are entirely dependent
upon the tropical rainforests for their survival needs and have created
landscapes that have resulted from long-term interactions with their
environments. 2  Thus, "[i]n many situations, groups who claim rights to
trees and other forest products may be particularly efficient in guarding
against unplanned harvesting of trees and forest products, especially where
the group has traditionally regarded the forest as its common property
203 U.N., EARTH SUMMIT +5, SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REVIEW AND
APPRAISE THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF AGENDA 21: SUCCESS STORIES FROM ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, at
http://www.un.orglesa/earthsummit/gef2.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). The Lak site failed due to
difficulties with ongoing and substantial conflicts with land use. Id. To avoid a similar problem, the Ramu
site is focusing on engaging the community and determining the social feasibility of conservation sites. Id.
204 ENVIRONMENT MONITOR, supra note 12, at 11.
205 AGARWAL AND NARAIN, supra note 3, at 30.
206 State Versus Custom, supra note 7, at 262.
207 See TACCONI, supra note 2, at 10.
208 GUSTAFSSON, supra note 30, at 6. See also Ron Martin, Small-Scale Community Based Forestry:
Issues in the Conservation of Papua New Guinea's Biodiversity, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREST
MANAGEMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 269, 270 (Colin Filer ed., 1997).
209 GUSTAFSSON, supra note 30, at 6.
210 U.N. CSD, Implementation of Forest-Related Decisions of the UNCED at the National and
International Levels, Including the Examination of Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Linkages, Programme
Element 1.3: Traditional Forest Related Knowledge, E/CN. 17/IF1996/9, paras 16-19 (1996).
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resource." 2 11 Even in cases where the state has tried to assert management
over forests, "group management may be a better alternative for preserving
threatened forests where state administrative capacity is not adequate at the
local level .... Such is the case in PNG, where customary owners have
continued to adhere to their traditional forms of forest management and
control, calling for even greater strength of their ownership rights under
growing pressure from commercial logging.2 13
V. CONCLUSION
Of the various forest sector issues, the costs of illegal logging and
214forest corruption remain the areas of greatest concern. In PNG, where a
large majority of the population remains rural and dependent upon natural
resources for subsistence economies, loss of forest resources to illegal
logging can be devastating to local and indigenous communities.
To secure their customary ownership, the indigenous people of PNG
can turn to constitutional and international instruments. However, the
Forestry Act of 1991 and the underdevelopment of customary property law
in the local land courts curtail the sovereignty of customary ownership.
Thus, the Act should be revised to allow direct negotiations, subject to
customary law, between customary landowners and loggers. The local land
courts have begun developing a legal basis for customary ownership and
should continue to be the forum for the evolution of this ownership.
As an adaptable framework comprised of long-term kin obligations,
customary ownership can be effective in protecting forests. Due to their
connection to and reliance on the forests, indigenous Papua New Guineans
can present the first line of defense in preventing the devastating
consequences of illegal logging.
211 Mitchell, supra note 112, at 29.
212 Id. at 30.
213 ARMITAGE, supra note 105, at 1.
214 WB SUSTAINING FORESTS, supra note 1, at appendix A-23.
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